The aim of this essay will be to demonstrate the following thesis — False witness violates the image of God as such; and consequently all instances in the law of Moses are magnifications of the moral law, applicable to the state and especially to the church. Such a principle will apply both to the secular kingdom and to the kingdom of Christ. The mode of its application will be different in each. For example there are punishments in the civil sphere where the public has such an interest in what I will call “civil lying” (e.g. fraud, perjury, tax evasion, treaty-breaking, etc.). On the other hand there will be a kind of court within the church as well. Various kinds of lying will become matters of church discipline; and such a sacred court will have a higher standard of truth-telling than may be expected of the world. Our focus will be especially on the Laws Concerning Witnesses in Deuteronomy 19:15-21.

What is the significance of its context for its meaning?

What is the context of these laws? Our answer to that depends on what context we mean. There are various systematic theological contexts in which we better understand the specific laws by knowing what is meant by the three forms of the law—moral, ceremonial, and judicial—and the way in which the law relates to God in general (cf. Ex. 20:1, Jam. 2:10) and to Christ in particular (cf. Lk. 24:44-45, Rom. 10:4). Then there are the various biblical theological contexts. As to the historical backdrop, there is the law given at Sinai and there is the recitation of that law for the second generation at the gates of the Promised Land. At certain points there is nuance in moving from the former to the latter. As to the literary form it is “legislative text” or “jurisprudence” [Currid, 82]. in spite of its other narrative diversities.

Does this particular law occur multiple times in the Pentateuch?

Although the passage in Deuteronomy is our center, there are parallel texts found in Exodus 20:16, 23:1-3, 6-8, Leviticus 5:1, and Deuteronomy 5:20. In these various elements of our main text are included. Is there any significance in this repetition throughout the Pentateuch? If nothing else, it echoes that the true witness is crucial to justice in Israel. Of all of the related laws on truthfulness, Deuteronomy 19:15-21 is of most interest to the thesis.

One reason is that the laws readdressed in Deuteronomy often have a more progressive character. In other words, more of ancient Israel’s permanent life in the land is in view. The other reason is that in this text the idea of a witness and a formal process is explicitly discussed. It is as if there is an ideal witness and an ideal courtroom. We may shudder at such a thought today. A courtroom may strike us a cold and wooden place. But to someone being oppressed it is a place of refuge and potential liberation. Thus the Old Testament is filled with the language of doing justice for the downtrodden.

What are the elements of this specific law?

There are a few noteworthy components of the command: 1. the number of witnesses; the integrity of the witnesses; 3. the role of the judge, or judges; and 4. the punishment.

(1) The Number of Witnesses. This is especially pertinent when the crime in view is a false witness. The Mosaic law addresses this by the principle of at least two witnesses: “A single witness shall not suffice against a person for any crime or for any wrong in connection with any offense that he has committed. Only on the evidence of two witnesses or of three witnesses shall a charge be established” (19:15; cf. Num. 35:30, Deut. 17:6).

(2) The Integrity of the Witnesses. Note that the false witness may be either the malicious witness or even the accuser. It is suggested by Gispen that the construction עֵד־חָמָ֖ס in this passage suggests “a witness of violence, of wrong,” in other words, “a witness who intended to do violence or wrong against the innocent by supporting the guilty party” [227]. It is a conspiracy of false witness. The other thing to notice about the integrity of the witness is that the prospects for justice in the case of all of the other commandments depend on the true witness. No doubt those who commit any of the other crimes will often maintain their innocence; and just as surely the innocent will often be blamed for committing those other crimes.

At this point the true witness is the hinge of the whole justice system. That is why the witnesses are cautioned against forming a faction to sabotage justice. In the Exodus 23 passage it says, “You shall not join hands with a wicked man to be a malicious witness. You shall not fall in with the many to do evil, nor shall you bear witness in a lawsuit, siding with the many, so as to pervert justice” (vv. 1-2).

Childs suggests the same Hebrew connotation of “set your hand with” תָּ֤שֶׁת יָֽדְךָ֙, in the conspiracy of kings (cf. 2 Ki. 15:19), in the good alliance of Ahikam the son of Shaphan to save the prophet (cf. Jer. 26:24), and in a plea of Job (cf. 30:2) [481]. In these there is a kind of locking arms together in a cause. This may have been a smaller “special interest group,” but may also be the more natural lure of the majority.

(3) The Role of the Judge, or Judges. To appear “before the LORD” shows us how the courtroom of God’s people has a kind of priority over secular courts. We will revisit this in the application section on the church. For now, we simply note that in Israel there was no divorce between the secular court and the priestly class. So it says to come “before the priests and the judges who are in office in those days” (v. 17). We may remember that the priests were to guard (שָׁמַר) the holy things of God. This refers principally to the sanctuary. However the courts of justice in Israel become a another kind of “sanctuary” so that the priests were also guardians of social justice.

In the Exodus 23 passage, twice there is reference to showing partiality toward the poor. Some have tried to make this mean the opposite. But Gispen points out that this was actually a temptation for judges, to appear a man of the people: a “false democracy” [227]. If this is really the emphasis, then we can see that a wealthier person is an image of God as well; and thus we cannot, out of envy, deprive even the rich man of his good name.

A classic New Testament passage is the example of Pilate — “he took water and washed his hands before the crowd, saying, ‘I am innocent of this man’s blood; see to it yourselves’” (Mat. 27:24). Such an action falsely assumes that one can opt out of rendering justice. It can be said of both the witnesses and judges that their chief object is justice. In a negative role they are obstructing justice. In Exodus 23:2, the verse ends with the infinitive להטת, which, in the English, is rendered “to pervert justice.” Note that the Hebrew word for justice is not present. One commentator argues that it is implied.

Neither the witnesses nor the judges are to show favoritism. They are not present to defend their own, but to tell the truth. If they know the truth, or know enough to find it out, then they are complicit in the false witness if they do not come to the aid of the oppressed with that truth.

(4) The Punishment Proper. Poythress remarks about the text that no damage was actually done. Hence the words “as he had meant to do.” Thus even where there is no material restoration there is still punishment. What then is prescribed? It says, “Then you shall do to him as he had meant to do to his brother” (v. 19). What can possibly be meant by this? Are God’s people to lie about the person who lied about another person! This would change Gandhi’s maxim a bit: “A lie for a lie makes the whole world x.” However, this would miss the point. This particular application of the lex talionis only makes sense 1. if there were objective damages sustained to the image of God by the original lie, and 2. if there was a real constructive remedy for those damages.

What is the meaning of this law to the original audience?

Given that this law is addressed in several places of the Pentateuch, principally in the ninth commandment, it would seem that the Israelites under Moses would have viewed this as a broad category similar to the other commandments of the second table of the Decalogue. The significance of this law being repeated in Deuteronomy is, in one sense, no different than the same for any of the other laws. Keil & Delitzsch give us a sort of mission statement of the whole law: “To secure life and property against false accusations” [938].

In getting to the heart of what this law would have meant to its original audience, we need to go deeper than the surface elements and ask: What is the essential object that has been violated? What is the nature of that violation? What is the desired end that goes by the name “restoration”? Answering these will go a long way toward showing how this judicial law is a manifestation of the general equity principle in the moral law.

First, what is the object that has been violated but the image of God? False witness is never a victimless crime. The command basically addresses a violence against other images of God. Childs points out the commonality of these laws with others in the ANE, and that one’s neighbor was “the full citizen within the covenantal community” [424].

Concisely stated, false witness murders and steals; or, to say it another way, to break the ninth commandment is to violate the spirit, if not also the letter, of the sixth and eighth commandments as well. Why is this the case? It is because the image of God has a very holistic stewardship from God: a matrix of covenant agreements, involving other people, plans, property, productivity, and even his own speech (which is really just intellectual property).

A false witness sends a shockwave of theft and murder and dishonor through the fabric of that total stewardship. It defaces the image, and cripples a portion of his capacities to glorify God. As one example, if a worker is lied about, he may expect less pay or less chance of a promotion, though he may be harder working and more qualified than others who will now move ahead.

Second, the exact nature of this violation called “false witness” follows from the first point. The word “spread,” of these false reports, which could be rendered “lift up” (Ex. 23:1), is meant to contain baseless charges from disseminating abroad. Even charges that wind up being true should not be discussed outside of appropriate circles. Gispen adds that “The Israelite may not give a ‘witness of falsehood,’” which includes “the whole spectrum of sins of the tongue: gossip, slander, flattery, etc.” [198]. However we must agree with Childs that, “The original commandment is, therefore, not a general prohibition of lying, but forbids lying which directly affects one’s fellow” [424].

Of the Exodus 23 passage, Cole suggests that a “malicious witness” is “better translated ‘witness in a charge of violence,’ for the thought is that a verdict will be fatal to the defendant” [184]. Consequently the overarching idea is that false witness is deliberate violence against God’s image (cf. Jam. 3:9), always causing measurable damage.

The two false witnesses ordered by Jezebel murdered Naboth and stole his vineyard for Ahab (cf. 1 Ki. 21:10-13); and the Psalmist cries out, “Give me not up to the will of my adversaries; for false witnesses have risen against me, and they breathe out violence” (Ps. 27:12). Childs suggests that a passage from Hosea evidences a broader interpretation of such commands by the time of the prophets: “there is swearing, lying, murder, stealing, and committing adultery; they break all bounds, and bloodshed follows bloodshed” (Hos. 4:2) [425]. Lying about someone out of court could get someone in court to begin with.

Finally, what is the end, or aim, of this law? In retributive justice the violator is taught the value of that which he has violated — both the person and the property (including that intellectual property of the man’s words). Compensation may have included such things as the materials for offerings: e. g. grain, bulls, etc. The implication seems to be that if a thief must restore the exact quantity of good stolen (plus some amount of interest), the false witness must at least restore the exact amount of truth that has been twisted. He must go to all who heard and explain that what he said is not true. However much the victim may “not be innocent” in other affairs, or in other respects, he is at least innocent of the particular false charge in view.

Significant literary, historical, or theological issues related to this law

For the present thesis, the most important issue, that is at once literary, historical, and theological, is this: How do these laws outside of the Decalogue “manifest” moral law? A distinction is made by Currid between the moral laws of the Decalogue and the מִּשְׁפָּטִים that begin at 21:1. This division may appear to separate the moral law from those laws given only within the context of Old Testament Israel.

Currid states that “the laws of the Book of the Covenant deal with the specific social and economic contexts of the people of Israel” [84]. In fairness to Currid, it would seem that all he means is that these Mosaic rules do not apply to other civil governments in terms of their exact audiences, circumstances, and punishments. Poythress holds to the same distinction, but adds that “this distinction is often a matter of degree” [101]. His example is helpful. It is the Fifth Commandment’s promise that “You will live long in the land.”

The repetition in Deuteronomy makes it plain who, primarily, will live long in the land. It is addressing Israel in the Promised Land. In other words, the cultural context of Old Testament Israel “intrudes” into the Ten Commandments as well. The moment we qualify this promise in the Fifth Commandment as addressing Israel in one sense and other people groups in another sense—the moment this distinction is made, we have abandoned the absolute division between the morality of the Decalogue and the spirit of the מִּשְׁפָּטִים. And of course Paul applies this very promise to Christian parents in the new covenant age (cf. Eph. 6:2-3).

Redd sees Deuteronomy 25:1-19 pertaining to the ninth commandment, given his wider framework of “stipulations” (4:44-26:19) [138]. The implication of this view is that such injustices as impoverished widows and crooked business practices were both instances of dishonesty. Woods explains the link between false witness and leprosy in Deuteronomy 24:8 by appealing to the punishment against Miriam for bearing false witness against Moses (cf. Num. 12:1) [252].

What such relationships begin to show is that the context for specific laws on false witness is the way in which a true witness is designed to uphold the integrity of the rest of the law.

All of the commandments are connected in many ways; but the role of the witness—and true speech in general—is unique in that such a concern for truth is precisely how one discerns innocence and guilt in the rest.

The way that general equity comes into play with false witness can be seen in one element of the law that seems to be retained in the New Testament: two or three witnesses. Is the law of Moses indeed saying that “all” that is required is two witnesses? What if another witness arises that contradicts their testimony? Then it is two against one. Case closed? Two wins? Is this really the spirit of the law? There is indication in extra-biblical Jewish writings that two witnesses can be false and judged by God on the spot [Daube, 4-5]. This tells us that the spirit of the law is not primarily about the exact number of witnesses, but about the care given to finding out the truth. More witnesses amounts to more accountability.

The application of the lex talionis to false witness is another example of general equity. Keil & Delitzsch report that “the same law existed in Egypt with reference to false accusers” [938]. Ridderbos says the same about the Code of Hammurabi [213]. In other words, that false witnesses deserved to have come upon them what they intended for their victim (Deut. 19:19) is something written on the heart of even the Gentiles (cf. Rom. 2:14-15). That false witness belongs to moral law, and thus natural law, is only to say that false witness has an objective nature or shape. This “shape” to false witness abides throughout all human societies. Scripture presents it as such.

We may say it like this: false witness destroys a society. We see this in Psalm 27:12 and Proverbs 6:19, 12:17, 19, 14:5, 19:5, 9, and 25:18. In these passages, false witness is organized around a principle of violence. It is divisive and deceptive. The perpetrator may last for a mere moment, but the destruction unleashed is incalculable (cf. Jam. 3:5-6). These things are true about false witness across the board. It is not merely “Israel-shaped,” though God’s special people certainly have been given a higher standard of truth and for the greatest possible purposes in Christ. However the basic evil in false witness will have the same effects among all people groups.

How does this law relate to Jesus Christ?

Is it possible to find the gospel in the laws for a true witness? Jesus came to bear witness to the truth (cf. Jn. 18:37); the testifying part of his passion is referred to as “the good confession” (1 Tim. 6:13); and we even find the accusers of Jesus bearing false witness against him (cf. Mat. 26:60). Such things may be interesting, but how is the truth-telling dimension of Jesus’ time on earth good news? How does it contribute to our redemption? If Jesus merely bore witness to the truth, all things being equal, we would all be condemned in court. Christ is called our “advocate with the Father” (1 Jn. 2:1).

Now he can only plead for us on the basis of a real righteousness; but since his is perfect, and since it is ours through faith (Phi. 3:9), it follows that his witness as our Great High Priest is true. Because of the work of Christ, the greatest false witness now comes from the accusations of the devil, to which God responds: “Who shall bring any charge against God’s elect? It is God who justifies. Who is to condemn? Christ Jesus is the one who died—more than that, who was raised—who is at the right hand of God, who indeed is interceding for us” (Rom. 8:33-34).

In what way is this law applicable as civil law today?

Poythress appears to give a criterion of “the public interest” in saying that, “the state deals with injuries against other human beings, not injuries against God” [159; cf. 135]. Behind this is the assumption that the very nature of repayment is that the injured party mediates, whether in receiving restitution or in exacting punishment. Mere humans cannot do this for God. Thus only commandments five through nine are matters of civil justice.

We will use the phrase ‘civil lying’ here to refer to that false witness that concerns the public. At this point libertarians will fear some encroachment of thought police. As a matter of fact, there is nothing terribly controversial here. Are not fraud, perjury, tax evasion, and treaty-breaking species of lying? Many will grant the point, but then they may still say, “But the government is not in the business of discerning our thoughts and declaring them true or false. In these matters they are only enforcing contracts.” Very well.

Any breach in these contracts: are these true statements or false statements? How can he who bears the sword from God (cf. Rom. 13:4) properly “punish those who do evil and praise those who do good” (1 Pet. 2:14) if he cannot tell the difference between the two? And this in the “civil species” of lying.

The fact of the matter is that every secular society already applies the ninth commandment to all sorts of public matters. Nor could they do otherwise.

What is the meaning of this law for God’s people today?

It has been said that “The analogue to Israel is not the modern state. The analogue to Israel is the church.” Consequently the next question has to be how to handle false witness in that society that is much closer to God’s people of old than secular society.

This higher standard is also supported by the way that Jesus strengthens the meaning of the law in the Sermon on the Mount. At first glance it may seem that Jesus is abrogating the “eye for an eye” principle (cf. Mat. 5:38, 39). Fernando replies to this that, “we must remember that Jesus is talking about personal revenge, not about legal systems” [481]. The same is echoed in Thompson: “Jesus’ criticism of this law … arose from its use to regulate conduct between individuals. He did not reject it as a principle of justice which should operate in the courts of the land” [218].

Our question is this: Is there still a “legal system” or “court” in the church that has jurisdiction over false witness? Our answer will be Yes. Without getting into issues of theonomy concerning the abiding comprehensiveness of the judicial law of Israel, it will still be my assumption that, at the very least, the third use of the law informs the courts of the church. The City of God presently has jurisdiction over false witness in our midst.

What about the criteria for restoration in this lifetime? If “double payment is the appropriate penalty for theft” [128], then what shall we say about the slandering of a Christian? Poythress distinguishes between punishment and restoration. Payment for sin implies both. But what of a just court in the church?

It may be objected that since Christ bore the punishment, there is nothing left to pay. This is an equivocation of term pay. The resources of repayment are a positive good. In the case the victims of false witness, the chief resource is one’s reputation. Whatever else may have been affected by slander, at least the perpetrator can work to restore the victim’s good name.

The New Testament cites the principle of two or three witnesses: cf. John 8:17 and Hebrews 10:28. The first is applied to discerning the truth about Jesus’ identity, and the second speaks of the law of Moses, but the author of Hebrews only does so to make a lesser to greater argument, moving from Old Covenant curses to those of the New. In other words, the “two or three witnesses” principles cannot be reduced to the judicial law of the Old Covenant.

But 2 Corinthians 13:1-2 is most interesting in this respect. Some think Paul is defending himself against the charge of embezzlement as indicated by the close of chapter 12. Against many commentators, including Calvin, it is countered that Paul is not speaking metaphorically as if his third visit will serve as a “third witness,” but that he is literally instructing the Corinthians to take the law of Moses seriously on this matter [Wellborn, 208]. This would be an odd thing to do if the law had no abiding application for the Christian.

If Poythress is correct in seeing God give the responsibility for repayment to individuals to resolve in private first, and only then the state gets involved [161], then Matthew 18:15-18 is really only the sanctified version of the same for the church. Likewise, crossing over the boundaries of church and state, Paul’s appeal to believers in 1 Corinthians 6 suggests that the higher court of the church suffers a major defeat in failing to resolve a conflict. As a consequence, the parties are now experiencing a kind of legal devolution.

Many seem to think there is some statute of limitations on the ninth commandment, such as when a person is either sufficiently removed in time (they are a historical figure), in space (they have moved far enough away), in prestige (their fame makes them fair game), or in wickedness (they serve the cause we oppose).

Much as an unborn child is sufficiently “out of sight and out of mind” to consider a person, so the object of false witness is kept at a comfortable distance for the arrows of our slander. In such cases no high standard of evidence is required because, we reason, the individual has passed into “public domain” rights.

The Heidelberg Catechism Q.112 is profound in applying the ninth commandment to us today: “I should do what I can to guard and advance my neighbor’s good name.” It is not enough for Christians to avoid false witness. This higher standard in the kingdom of Christ calls us to proactively be the true witness, to work toward that specific justice that promotes others’ good name.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Childs, Brevard. The Book of Exodus. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974

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Fernando, Ajith. Deuteronomy. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012

Grispen, W. H. Exodus. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982

Harris, R. Laird, Gleason Archer & Bruce Waltke. Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, Vol. I. Chicago: Moody Press, 1980

Harris, R. Laird, Gleason Archer & Bruce Waltke. Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, Vol. I. Chicago: Moody Press, 1980

Keil, C. F. & F. Delitzsch. Commentary on the Old Testament, Volume I: The Pentateuch. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2006

Motyer, J. A. The Message of Exodus. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005

Poythress, Vern. The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses. Nashville, TN: Wolgemuth & Hyatt, 1991

Ridderbos, J. Deuteronomy. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984

Thompson, J. A. Deuteronomy. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1974

Van Pelt, Miles. ed. A Biblical-Theological Introduction to the Old Testament. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2016

Welborn, Laurence L. “By the Mouth of Two or Three Witnesses: Paul’s Invocation of a Deuteronomic Statute” Novum Testamentum 52 (2010) 207-220

Woods, Edward J. Deuteronomy. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011