Introducing Theological Objections to Natural Theology
This study will be divided into seven main sections corresponding to seven kinds of theological objections to natural theology. It is important to note that these are not philosophical objections in the sense that they do not come from skeptics. There is often an intersection between philosophical matters and theological concerns. However, since the goal here is to clear ground for what is ultimately a systematic theological project, it is especially the hesitations of theologians that must be removed.
These objections tend to be more concerned with how natural theology would distort the view we have of God or His revelation even if (or when) one comes to faith and begins to start doing the rest of their theology. It is also the case that some objections are not against natural theology in total but against a particular kind of natural theology. Since I defend classical natural theology, only such objections as are raised against it will be covered.
I must call these “kinds of objections” rather than each “an objection,” for the simple reason that, even among academics, these have come in many different forms1 and often overlap with each other.2 Not only have there been different ways to express each, but forms may be diverse enough to be driving at substantially different points and yet usefully placed under the same general heading.
At any rate, these seven kinds of objections will be called:
(1) “Inconclusive” or “Insufficient” Objections;
(2) “Warranted Belief” Objections;
(3) “Intuitive over Discursive” Objections;
(4) “Greater Than Scripture” Objections;
(5) “God of the Philosophers” Objections;
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1. As an instance of other classifications, Douglas Groothius, in his book Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011), 174-184, offers a list of nine such objections: (1) biblical omission, (2) biblical authority, (3) the noetic effects of sin, (4) direct knowledge of God, (5) proofs lead to pride, (6) natural theology in competition with special revelation, (7) religious irrelevance, (8) complexity of proofs, and (9) relational weakness.
2. As a recent example, consider what Paul K. Moser refers to as his own “deflationary view” in Natural Theology: Five Views, James K. Dew Jr. and Ronnie P. Campbell Jr., ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2024), 153-74. On the one hand, the impetus for Moser’s view has to do with my first category of “inconclusive” or “insufficient” objections; on the other hand, his alternative model is motivated by restricting natural theology to having an “interrogatory value,” which is another species of my final category of “humbled apologetics” objections.
