Romans 13:1-7 — A Contextual-Doctrinal Consideration
Having looked at the biblical-theological background to Romans 13:1-7, we can now zoom in the lens, so to speak, both to the immediate context of Chapter 13 as well as to the way that Paul is using not merely words, but concepts. One of the most inexcusable errors in approaching this passage is to ignore its place in the flow of the Apostle’s overall argument. Conservative theologians and commentators do this with this text in ways that they would never dream of doing with any other text. Anxious to rid the biblical record of any weight of political responsibility on the Christian, this text is taken off of the shelf only in order to silence debate about both its meaning and application. Let us press onward to be better interpreters than that.
Divine Justice—from Gospel Doctrine to Ethics
The attribute of God that is most clearly on display in the magistrate-citizen relationship is justice. However, the way that God is glorified in his justice differs in each party. For the magistrate, it is the function of his office. It is a more explicit action. He regularly executes civil justice. For the citizen, his relation to that office is also a relation to justice: both his internal attitude and his external response.
There is one Old Testament text that is relevant to Romans 13 not yet included in our survey. That is because it did not concern the citizen’s obedience so much as the power of the state. Genesis 9:5-6 may easily be argued to contain the seminal form of the legitimacy of civil force because of the scope of the parties to whom God addresses.1 Paul uses a piece of imagery here to depict this legitimate force: the sword (v. 4). Murray comments that this “is not merely the sign of his authority but of his right to wield it in the infliction of that which a sword does.”2
There are two reasons to see this as a euphemism for legitimate civil force per se. First, Paul is not saying that anyone who goes around carrying a sword is therefore one of these legitimate authorities; second, Paul is not saying that any state that uses other instruments (guns, for example) for physical restraint or punishment is therefore an illegitimate state. That may seem obvious enough at first glance; but we will want to hold that thought.
Ladd sees Paul’s overall view of the state as essentially pragmatic and eschatological. As to the latter he even hypothesizes that “Paul’s reference to a restraining power holding back the lawlessness of antichrist (2 Thess. 2:6) is to the Roman government as an instrument of law and order.”3 So much for circumstances. What does the civil magistrate say about God? Can we make a connection between the theology of Romans as a whole and this particular exhortation?
To answer this we must note a prominent divine attribute manifest in the civil sphere. What is meant by wrath in verses 4 and 5? The word ὀργή is one of two main Greek words that is translated into the English word “wrath” or “anger.” It is generally recognized to be that wrath that is a righteous disposition. Why then would Paul use ὀργή to describe the execution of temporal justice, as he did in 1:18 to describe what God executes upon sinners on the more eternal scale? One reason seems obvious. Paul is literally “putting the fear of God” into any Christian who is taking civil disobedience lightly. Another angle is that the word is here in the accusative: ὀργὴν. Now the significance cannot be plumbed simply by noting the grammar and syntax. It is an awkward use in verse 4, as the human actor is acting not “upon” wrath, but “with” it, he himself being God’s instrument. Nor is it his own human wrath.4 A comparison of different translations of that portion of verse 4 may be useful.
1. “for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil” (KJV)
2. “for it is a minister of God, an avenger who brings wrath on the one who practices evil” (NASB)
3. “They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer” (NIV)
4. “For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God’s wrath on the wrongdoer” (ESV)
In other words, civil justice is a portion of God’s present wrath. In Chapter 1 the function of divine wrath was, in one sense of the word, permissive.5 Human beings were actually let go by God to fall deeper into their rebellion (1:24, 26, 28). If it seems as if God is being more lenient on his rebels than the earthly magistrate is called to be, that is only because of the difference between perfect-final vengeance and the imperfect-temporal kind. Paul appeals to the former in 12:19 as a motive for patient kindness in the face of mistreatment.
For many the dominant theological strand from Romans 1-11 that informs this text is sin, and that in an eschatological context. One author speaks as if 13:1-7 belongs to the old world of force, sin, and death. There is “in Rom 13 an expectation that rulers both know and serve the good, an expectation hard to reconcile with Paul’s insistence in chapters 1–8 that all human beings are subject to the power of Sin.”6 One solution is to see 13:1-7 as a later insertion. Another is to comfortably dismiss Paul as out of touch with the almost universal abuse of governmental power. This author, Beverly Roberts Gaventa, resists both temptations, and rightly brings in Paul’s use of Pharaoh in Romans 9 to make the point that Paul is exalting God in Romans 13 and not the earthly authorities.7 Whatever good the office holder displays will be derivative and even dispensable.
Divine Justice—Exemplified and Motivating
How does divine justice, displayed in the magistrate, translate into any motive for the Christian citizen’s godly submission? The motivation is actually similar to the more private exhortation of 12:19. Vengeance belongs to God. Peter makes a few statements in his first letter that are very illuminating on this matter. The upshot is that Jesus looked to final justice in the face of temporal injustice. He did this at the heart of the gospel; and Peter mentions it directly after the section on submission to the state: “when he suffered, he did not threaten, but continued entrusting himself to him who judges justly” (1 Pet. 2:23). In other words, trusting in the perfection of final justice cultivates a willingness to wait under imperfect temporal justice. Here common grace and the gospel work together.
“Christians are not to take retributive justice into their own hands, but rather are to submit to the God-established governmental authorities in these matters (13:4b).”8
The simplest motive presented in the text is an appeal to our conscience before God: “not only to avoid wrath, but also for the sake of conscience” (v. 5). 1 Peter 2:13 has this same thing in mind: subjection “for the Lord’s sake.” The indication is that the true Christian knows the norm. Under general circumstances, rebellion incurs God’s wrath.
There is another way that God’s justice through the civil magistrate provides ethical data to the Christian citizen. It is a controversial idea today, but it has great support from church history. I am referring to what is sometimes called “the lesser magistrate doctrine.” Although some trace its roots back to some of Calvin’s descendents,9 it has precursors in several works prior to the Reformation.10 Because of the limits of this essay, my only concern is to show how the text itself might actually inform such a doctrine. The most concise way to put it is this:
When Paul speaks of what God has done with this character called the “authority,” there is not merely “decree language” but also “design language.” In other words, Paul’s words do not merely say that God has willed for x individual to be in power in this time or place, but that God has built the office with a definite, and limited, nature. It does not do everything, but simply punishes the bad and praises the good, and this in matters pertaining to civic interest.
An objection may easily be imagined in the following form: “Paul’s exhortation is entirely to Christian citizens and not at all to the magistrate. Consequently even the ethical demands that God places on the magistrate, being implied in this text, are really none of our business.” Several replies could be given. A hermeneutical reply would be sufficient. Let us ask whether this objection could be applied across the board and on what principle. This test would require analogous situations; and texts that exhort Christians to submit to authorities in various institutions would be the obvious choice for the comparison. So it is to relevant New Testament parallel texts that we now turn.
Parallel Texts in the New Testament
One important note to strike here is that Paul is echoing what Jesus had already commanded about taxes. Compare 13:7 to Matthew 22:15-22.11 Of course those who live by the maxim “taxation is theft” will also add Matthew 17:25-27 to that point of comparison.
“Jesus spoke to him first, saying, “What do you think, Simon? From whom do kings of the earth take toll or tax? From their sons or from others?” And when he said, “From others,” Jesus said to him, “Then the sons are free. However, not to give offense to them, go to the sea and cast a hook and take the first fish that comes up, and when you open its mouth you will find a shekel. Take that and give it to them for me and for yourself.”
All of this seems to create a significant dilemma in the whole biblical worldview. If Jesus commanded that we pay our taxes, and yet taxation is theft, then it would follow that Jesus commands theft. But this would put Jesus at odds with the eighth commandment. Or, putting it in the language of Matthew 17, is Jesus simply relativizing our obligation to pay taxes in the same way as he is relativizing obedience as a whole in Matthew 22:15-22? So the “sons of the kingdom” are ultimately not property of the state, but so as “not to give offense” there is a normal obligation?
What is most pertinent concerning Christ’s words about taxes is the larger context of what he said about authority and obedience. D. A. Carson provides an apt summation. After pointing out the dual nature of the answer to “Whose image is this?” he adds, “Far from privatizing God’s claim, that is, the claim of religion, Jesus’ famous utterance means that God always trumps Caesar.”12
All things belong to King Jesus. Some of those things have been delegated to the earthly king. Scripture commands a relative obedience to that which is delegated in proportion to the design of our Lord,13 to whom alone obedience is unqualified and absolute.14 That all secular governments are Christ’s property fits the context of Romans 13:1 very well.
A clearer passage for many is Acts 4:1-22, where Peter and John stand before the Jewish authorities. After being questioned by the authorities and pressured to submit, their culminating words are: “Whether it is right in the sight of God to listen to you rather than to God, you must judge, for we cannot but speak of what we have seen and heard” (vv. 19-20). Advocates of unqualified obedience to the state would object to normative use of this text on the grounds that these Apostles were preaching the gospel. “Of course the Christian is to continue to preach the gospel!”
However it is not clear where to draw the line around this lone “exception” of justifiable civil disobedience. Does one draw it at speech per se, speech content, audience, application, etc? The most straightforward way to read this passage is that Peter and John are drawing the line at “what God has said,” such that if the civil magistrate commands the Christian to believe, speak, or act contrary, then we must “listen to God” rather than man. To limit this civil disobedience to “gospel speech” certainly begs a few questions that this text does not seem to explicitly answer.
1 Peter 2:13-17 is also a crucial text because it implies both the decree and design elements already mentioned. When that Apostle commanded, “Honor the emperor” (v. 17), this was Nero. Clearly the divine decree to raise up every single ruler is in play. We cannot object to the office because of how evil the man is. On the other hand the office is given form by those same scriptures. The civil office is designed “to punish those who do evil and to praise those who do good” (v. 14). The Apostles several times warned against false liberty that rebels against authority for insufficient reasons. So Peter says “not using your freedom as a cover-up for evil” (v. 16). The implication is that there are sufficient reasons that were being twisted.
One more piece of the puzzle is necessary. Submission is a broader category than obedience, even when the words for “obey” (Eph. 5:21, 22, 24; 6:1, 5; Col. 3:18, 20, 22; 2 Thess. 3:14; Heb. 13:17) and “be subject” or “submit” (Rom. 13:1, 5; 1 Cor. 16:16; Heb. 13:17; 1 Pet. 2:13, 18; 3:1; 5:5) are used. That is because obedience to human authorities is relative to the ultimate authority of Christ. Children, wives, slaves, church members, and citizens are called to be submissive in all things and yet also find occasions in which to disobey with a submissive spirit. There is no contradiction here because of the concept of derived authority. Because the earthly authorities are derivative—a portion and stewardship of Christ’s authority—the submission is consequently relativized. Two texts in the Pastoral Letters round out our survey: and Titus 3:1-2 round out our survey.
“First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people, for kings and all who are in high positions, that we may lead a peaceful and quiet life, godly and dignified in every way” (1 Timothy 2:1-2).
“Remind them to be submissive to rulers and authorities, to be obedient, to be ready for every good work, to speak evil of no one, to avoid quarreling, to be gentle, and to show perfect courtesy toward all people.” (Titus 3:1-2).
Two observations about these two texts: 1. The agenda of the civic rulers is not what is being prayed for. Indeed, the opposite could be argued since, given the context of 1 Timothy 2, the gospel going forth unmolested is the end for which the governing officials leaving the church in peace is the means. 2. The design of Paul to the Cretans through Titus is concerned about witness. Be model citizens. For the glory of Rome? Not in the least! It is really the same as the prayer—which is really the same as in 1 Peter 2:13-14, which is really the same as in Romans 13. Can see how these texts are all functioning? The New Testament letters were not developing a grand Christian political theory. They were written to churches in the span of only a few years during times of persecution and in a context in which most Christians had no civic rights in the Empire. Everything here is provisional. In none of these ideas is the state supreme. The Apostles are giving Spirit-inspired underground counsel to Christians throughout the ages for how to maneuver with the gospel in the teeth of a secular government. But the question of whether there may be (or ought to be) Christian-led government, and how to conduct civics in a Christian framework—one has to go to the larger framework of Scripture for that. To suggest that these handfull of texts in the New Testament to the “underground” and “provisional” context somehow invalidates the more numerous portions of Scripture on the moral law is an absurdity characteristic of our anti-intellectual times.
Integrating the Texts in the Christian Life
Careful reflection upon this text and its parallels in Old and New Testament make it exceedingly difficult to maintain the pietist maxim that “The Bible has nothing to say about politics.” While it is true that the Scriptures do not offer us a one-size-fits-all public policy, and while we are warned against any form of idolatry (of which politics offers many), it is simply not true that there are no clear implications for politics in such passages. All sorts of political programs, radical agendas, state worship, forms of civil disobedience, and forms of government are ruled out by Paul’s teaching in Romans 13:1-7. While we may be called to bear suffering under tyranny, we are not given a black check by Paul to set up one. Nor is the magistrate given a blank check on the citizen’s obedience.
The earthly magistrate is ultimately neither a set of circumstances surrounding a particular officer, nor his particular performance in that office, whether good or evil. The earthly magistrate is fundamentally an office designed by God. That office is the essential object in view for the Christian’s submission. That is why the principle can apply to diverse forms of government. To argue otherwise is immediately self-defeating.
It is the advocate of statism, in whatever collectivist form, who wants to have his cake and eat it too with respect to this passage. Romans 13:1-7 is wielded as if were the scepter of Christ at the American Christian to force submission to the present day federal government. When the Christian replies that in our form of government, the people, via the Constitution, are actually in the position to legally redress and, if necessary, prosecute the civil magistrate, the advocate of statism cries foul and changes the terms of the text.
Like it or not, in the United States form of government, political power flows from the individuals in the several States, through those representatives, to the Federal Government. I understand that this interpretation is controversial in recent decades. But I also reject the postmodern notion that we have a right to make words mean whatever we want them to—even if it is done in the name of supposedly holding biblical words in a higher esteem.
Paul’s words cannot be twisted to make obedience “to the man” so much as to the office, no matter the man. What follows is that if the form of government in question places the man under the same law as the citizens, then the man in office is the proper object of both obedience and lawful prosecution, depending on his relation to that law. Far from demanding unconditional obedience to the state, Paul’s exhortation here actually sets up a general submission of all citizens (including the magistrate) to the rule of law. Such law implies officers: divinely ordained authority figures. However, the design of the office that they occupy is as much a divine ordinance as the obedience God commands of the citizenry. This was the dominant Christian position from at least the high Middle Ages to the end of the twentieth century.
If my thesis is true to Paul’s thinking, then we may have to accept that several historical “revolutions” were, at least in their main principle, biblically permissible after all: e. g., (1) the barons of England standing up to Prince John and forcing agreement to the Magna Carta in 1215; (2) the execution of Charles I by the Parliamentarians at the close of the English Civil War, 1642 to 1649; and yes, even (3) the War for Independence by the American Colonies from 1775 to 1781. Of course we would have to turn to other evidence to decide on their respective levels of moral permissibility. However we can at least say that in each case the earthly magistrate exceeded the boundaries of the law, thereby breaking the terms of the covenant and abdicating his divinely ordained office. We may even challenge whether these may be called “revolutions” at all rather than lawful prosecutions of objective tyranny.
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1. Space prohibits such a justification here. However Schreiner seems to agree by saying, “Paul would not have flinched in endorsing the right of ruling authorities to practice capital punishment since Gen. 9:6 supports it by appealing to the fact that human beings are made in God’s image” (Romans, 684, italics mine).
2. Murray, The Epistle to the Romans, 152.
3. Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, 575.
4. cf. Murray, The Epistle to the Romans, 153.
5. Waters calls this “divine abandonment” (BTINT, 183).
6. Beverly Roberts Gaventa, “Reading Romans 13 with Simone Weil: Toward a More Generous Hermeneutic.” JBL 136, no. 1 (2017): 11.
7. Gaventa, “Reading Romans 13 with Simone Weil: Toward a More Generous Hermeneutic.” 16.
8. Longenecker, The Epistle to the Romans, 961.
9. cf. David Hall, Calvin in the Public Square (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 2009), 129-90
10. Hall, Calvin in the Public Square, 4-23.
11. cf. Mark 12:13-17; Luke 20:19-26
12. D. A. Carson, Christ & Culture Revisited (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008); 57.
13. In a similar vein to the Kuyperian notion of “sphere sovereignty,” Murray comments: “It is not the prerogative of the ruler to deal with all sin but only with sin registered in the actions which violate the order that the magistrate is appointed to maintain and promote” (The Epistle to the Romans, 151).
14. Waters seems to agree with this in saying: “Our obedience to these rulers is not implicit. Both they and we stand under God, and we may never obey human authority when that means disobedience to God” (BTINT, 193).