Those who tell us that the Western commitment to individual rights—principally life, liberty, and property—is at odds with the biblical worldview show themselves ignorant of both sources. We might treat the two systematically. That is, we might show how they really come to mean the same thing when it comes to rights. However it is valuable to show the truth emerging from the text of Scripture in its narrative flow. This has the advantage not only of satisfying the biblicist impulse to take nothing that is not “in the text,” but it also traces out a historical development. Without further ado, let us go back to the beginning. Or at least let us go back to the reaffirmation of the creational order in the Noahic Covenant, since we have already displayed the significance of the image of God per se.

Genesis 9:5-6: The Foundation of Just Force

This is really the seminal text for the civil use of the moral law. We will focus on the portion that addresses man’s duty in relation to man:

From his fellow man I will require a reckoning for the life of man. “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image.”

We may remember that the narrative just prior had God judge the world in a flood, because of the excessive wickedness that had run its course (6:6). So we might ask: is this command of force a necessary evil or a good restraint? Either answer presupposes the sinfulness of man. G. K. Chesterton famously quipped,

“The strongest saints and the strongest skeptics alike took positive evil as the starting point of their argument. If it be true (as it certainly is) that a man can feel exquisite happiness in skinning a cat, then the religious philosopher can only draw one of two deductions. He must either deny the existence of God, as all atheists do; or he must deny the present union between God and man, as all Christians do. The new theologians seem to think it a highly rationalistic solution to deny the cat.”1

Now I bring in sin at this point for a specific audience. Mark the man, or woman, who devalues individual rights for some supposedly pious reason. They will make much of sin—that is, they will make much of the sins of the sinner being violated by the state. About the evil intentions of the state, they will roll their eyes and huff and puff. Our cat-skinning friend they will acknowledge. The argument must proceed, but I bring this up advisedly. Let the reader understand.

Returning to the text itself, five observations must be made:

(i) this commandment is to all mankind following Noah, as they are the lone survivors of humanity;

(ii) this is a divine command;

(iii) the substance of the command is to take the life of the murderer;

(iv) the ultimate reason given by God for this response to murder is that the murdered man is an image of God;

(v) the immediate context, both before and after this verse, is a reiteration of the language of the original covenant with Adam, namely to multiply the image and exercise dominion (vv. 1-4, 7).

Immediate implications of these clear facts, in order are: (from 1) Since it is to all mankind, it cannot be reduced to the Mosaic legislation to Israel alone; (from 2) Since God cannot command evil, the action commanded cannot be reduced to either “murder” (Ex. 20:13) nor to “vengeance” (Rom. 12:19); (from 3) Building off of implication 2, we add that God cannot contradict himself between Genesis 9:5-6 and Exodus 20:13 and Romans 12:19; (from 4) the just use of force is rooted in the image of God. Whatever the image of God entails, and whenever that is violated, will tell us when force is just; (from 5) the surrounding of the command to take life in justice with the original positive flourishing of human life is suggestive of the good of civil government.

Question: Does this ordain force alone, or is there an ordained institution as well? To begin answering that, let’s look at how Samuel Rutherford viewed this stage of development in Lex Rex. In short, the just use of force is given BY God, THROUGH nature: “That a power of making laws is given by God as a property flowing from nature.”2

Rutherford saw the inherent right to defend life, liberty, and property (self-government) as natural law and the “devolving out power over in the hands of one or more rulers” (civil government) in the specific circumstances of each nation to positive law, and the “rise” from nature to magistrate per se he will call, with Plato, a “secondary law of nature.” He does not simply mean the specific constitutional form, but that any delegation of office, arises from the positive law and not from pure nature. In other words, God has ordained man with these properties and duties. He has not ordained civil government with these, except in extension of the same.

Parallel terms Rutherford uses to this (1) right of self-government and this (2) rise of civil government are a (1) natural covenant and a (2) political, or civil, covenant. Since magistrate and citizens are all equal images under natural law, therefore the authority under human law is provisional to the order or violation of that higher court of law: natural law. We need to remember this foundation when we get to a mere one of its expressions in Paul’s words in Romans 13:1. For now we simply note that this avoids the extremes of (1) express institutionalism and (2) rational contract voluntarism. In the first, “God ordained government” equals “God’s word says, ‘Behold! Government. Thou shalt relate to it in x, y, z manner!’” The second extreme error really follows from the first. In lieu of such divine ordination in express ink patterns, the only option we think there is left is that civil man arose from a “state of nature” to autonomously create government A to Z. 

Romans 13:1-5: “Design versus Decree” Language

We need to remember that Paul is writing to the Roman church and yet the Scripture applies to all ages (cf. 2 Tim. 3:16-17). Both of these must be kept in the balance. We must first make a few points of historical context.

(i) If the traditional date is correct (57-58 AD), then Caesar at this point meant Nero.

(ii) Jew-Gentile tensions may shed some light. The previous emperor Claudius had expelled the Jews from the city in 49 AD for what was conceived as a disturbance over “Chrestus.”3 

(iii) At this point there was already precedence for viewing this new sect as antisocial. Admittance of Jewish believers back into the church, as the edict was rescinded, brought to Paul’s mind the importance of showing that Christians were good citizens.

On to features of the passage itself:

1. By the distinction between DECREE and DESIGN we mean that Paul’s various words about “authorities” (the thing itself) being “from God” (the source of the thing), or words like “terror” and “judgment” and “wrath,” or even “God’s servant for your good”—these are all referents filled with objective meaning. When Paul speaks of any one of these things, we must always ask: Is he talking about God’s decree, that each instance is decreed to be so in history? Or is he also talking about God’s design, that each of these things is what it is, objectively? That it ought to be so, and thus owes God a moral service? Most theologians and commentators will recognize that both are in play.

The pietistic pastor skips all that thinking and glosses quickly over it, reading it as if it is only a fatalistic decree. A blank check to the state. A proclamation of intimidation to the church: to get back in the corner, and grovel in their chains, and stop asking questions.

That is not how this text has traditionally been understood throughout church history. Oh, there has been that Statist tradition, but that tradition has been in the minority of recognized theologians. 

2. Paul uses a piece of imagery here to depict this legitimate force: the sword (v. 4). Murray comments that this “is not merely the sign of his authority but of his right to wield it in the infliction of that which a sword does.”4

3. The word for ‘ministers’ (λειτουργοὶ) is different in verse 6 than the two uses in verse 4 (διάκονός). Is there any significance to this? In verse 4 the word is the more common for servant, from which we derive “deacon,” while λειτουργός often has the connotation of religious service (cf. Luke 1:23; Acts 13:2; Rom. 15:16, 27; 2 Cor. 9:12; Phil. 2:17; Heb. 1:7, 14; 8:2; 10:11). So there is no doubt that both the office (servant) and the function (sword) are depicted as a divine design for executing justice. And that makes sense in light of Genesis 9:5-6, “I will require it.”

Questions to trouble the Statist interpretation.

(i) Do we apply this to the form of government we are under, or not? If not, then the text does not apply. If so, then what form of government do we have? One cannot have it both ways. If we are going to make Romans 13 apply to us, then that will mean applying it not only to the specific form of government at each time and place, but the broader legal tradition in which that country exists — that is relevant in cases of swift revolution where it is no lawful order to create a mob and erase a past.

(ii) If we are to obey today’s magistrates, which competing magistrate? Supposing the reply is: “Well, it is the one that our form of law says is the highest.” But our Constitutional form says “We the people [who do ordain] …” are the highest, through the Agency of the States (Amendments IX and X). And to the tiresome objection, that cites the Supremacy Clause from Art. VI, my reply will always be: Read it again until you read it right. It does not say, “The mob in D. C.” or even “the present office-holders” shall be the supreme law of the land; but rather “This Constitution,” and so the laws “in pursuance thereof” are lawful. Those that are not are unlawful.

(iii) To the Statist’s next typical objection, “We are not competent judges of such matters, but must simply obey ‘the man’ in view.” But I must ask again: Which one—the one in Party A that says x is how power is situated? Or the one in the opposite, Party B?” And it is replied that the man with the “highest” amount of power, note that this has degenerated in to the logic of Thasymachus of old, or of Nietzsche. Might has come full circle to make right, which is hardly Paul’s point. 

(iv) If it is simply the one we perceive can do the most physical harm, then are we really even talking about legitimate government anymore, or are we speaking of forces of nature or even pagan deities? And this is a subject we will come back to in great detail. 

Back to the Romans 13 text, if this is language of decree only, what follows? Rutherford argued against those who considered the power of government sanctioned by God, but everything about the form an abstraction from providence. This extracting of decree from design reduces that sanction to that providence, of which we can say the same about sin: “This is a great debasing of the Lord’s anointed.”5

Murray comments that, “It is not the prerogative of the ruler to deal with all sin but only with sin registered in the actions which violate the order that the magistrate is appointed to maintain and promote.”6 Waters seems to agree with this objective design language in saying: “Our obedience to these rulers is not implicit. Both they and we stand under God, and we may never obey human authority when that means disobedience to God.”7 

A word about a parallel New Testament text: 1 Peter 2:13-14. Note here the historical circumstance in Peter’s point about the “emperor as supreme” (v. 13) and that [provincial] governors are “sent by him” (v. 14). Grotius cited this, along with an approving quote by Augustine toward the same end, that when there is a conflict, we obey the superior magistrate: that is the emperor. However, this is clearly a statement of historical context and not a description of all forms of government. Speaking of that context, Rutherford argues that (i) Jeremiah’s instruction to the Jews in Babylon and (ii) here to the same people under Roman occupation, that these were both “God’s special commandment” to live temporarily under “unjust conquerors.” These two texts in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 (no less than the Jeremiah passages) were not meant to be a panacea on politics as a whole.

The Image of God: From the Sword to the Coin

Derived authority is provisional authority. Let us now look at Matthew 22:17-21.

Tell us, then, what you think. Is it lawful to pay taxes to Caesar, or not?” But Jesus, aware of their malice, said, “Why put me to the test, you hypocrites? Show me the coin for the tax.” And they brought him a denarius. And Jesus said to them, “Whose likeness and inscription is this?” They said, “Caesar’s.” Then he said to them, “Therefore render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”

The coin may be viewed as a “pie chart” of sorts, or even (for those obscure enough to remember a course in logic) an Euler diagram.

D. A. Carson put it in this way:

“When Jesus asks the question, “Whose image is this? And whose inscription?” biblically informed people will remember that all human beings have been made in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26) … If we give back to God what has his image on it, we must all give ourselves to him. Far from privatizing God’s claim, that is, the claim of religion, Jesus’ famous utterance means that God always trumps Caesar.”8

All things belong to King Jesus (Mat. 28:18). Some of those things have been delegated to the earthly king. Scripture commands a relative obedience to that which is delegated in proportion to the design of our Lord, to whom alone obedience is unqualified and absolute. “All authority” belonging to Christ includes total authority over the magistrates. That is as true in the New Testament (Rev. 1:5), as it was in the Old Testament (Psalm 2, 82).

It is not merely the magistrate whose role develops in the biblical narrative. It used to be common knowledge in the Western tradition that the free citizen found himself as well. Both magistrate and citizen were now under the same law because both were images of God and the civil law pertained to that. That was its end. It could not have any contrary end.

But the realization of being an image of God is a liberation from the cosmic machine. Theologians and commentators have noted the comparison between Moses’ statement of the “image” (Gen. 1:26-27), which image was God’s vice-regent, presiding over God’s paradise temple—compared to that Pharaoh they had just escaped from, who thought only of himself as the divine representative on earth, and who would never let a commoner in his garden or his temple. 

For all of this, there is still authority and submission, even down to the last of the New Testament. There is no getting around that. Nor is there any need to get around it in the traditional Christian ethic.

Titus 3:1 and 1 Timothy 2:1-2 are two other texts to be considered. The context of Titus is the bad reputation of the Cretans for licentiousness. This reinforces the “polemical example” context of the Romans and 1 Peter 2 texts. In the case of the prayers Paul commends to Timothy, the hope for the authorities is not intrinsic to their plans, but extrinsic to the gospel going forth unmolested.  

We might also look at the examples of Jesus in John 18:23; 19:11, or of the Apostles in Acts 4:19-20; 25:11; 22:25-29. These are familiar passages. Certainly Jesus is going to the cross and so there is no question of taking his liberties here, as he was willingly sacrificed for his people. In a manner following his example, Paul was going to be poured out as a drink offering as it were.

Pietists (who, I would remind the reader, are servants of the Statist view, whether unwittingly or not) believe that the salvific purposes of Jesus and his Apostles in these texts makes the opposite point: e.g. that legal rights were not on their minds. Actually the reverse is true. It is precisely because they brought up such rights and the real matters of power in the act of subjecting themselves to gospel-telling deaths that makes things all the more awkward for those that would banish objective politics from the pages of Scripture. Even while acting out the gospel and establishment of the church, the civic truth was still the civic truth. There is never virtue in joining the Statist in his abusive murderous lie.

The main lesson from Caesar’s coin and the apostolic example in chains is this: The NT context for obedience and submission is always relativized. In fact submission is always broader category than obedience, even when the words for “obey” (Eph. 5:21, 22, 24; 6:1, 5; Col. 3:18, 20, 22; 2 Thess. 3:14; Heb. 13:17) and “be subject” or “submit” (Rom. 13:1, 5; 1 Cor. 16:16; Heb. 13:17; 1 Pet. 2:13, 18; 3:1; 5:5) are used. That is because obedience to human authorities is relative to the ultimate authority of Christ.

Children, wives, slaves, church members, and citizens are called to be submissive in all things and yet also find occasions in which to disobey with a submissive spirit. There is no contradiction here because of the concept of derived authority. Why we can see this about those other institutions, where the same words are used as in the Romans 13 text—home, labor, church—and yet not see the same about the civil magistrate is a mystery. Or is it? I do not think it is. For many it is because they worship the state. For others it is because they are cowards. Let us not mince words here.

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1. G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York: Image, 1990), 15.

2. Samuel Rutherford, Lex Rex, Q.2.

3. Guy Prentiss Waters, BTINT, 171.

4. John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), 152.

5. Rutherford, Lex Rex, Q.6.

6. Murray, Principles of Conduct, 151.

7. Waters, BTINT, 193.

8. D. A. Carson, Christ & Culture Revisited (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 57.